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Discussion Paper
A predictive processing theory of sensorimotor
contingencies: Explaining the puzzle of perceptual
presence and its absence in synesthesia
Anil K. Seth
Sackler Centre for Consciousness Science, School of Engineering and Informatics, University of
Sussex, Brighton, UK
Normal perception involves experiencing objects within perceptual scenes as real, as existing in the world. This
property of “perceptual presence” has motivated “sensorimotor theories” which understand perception to involve
the mastery of sensorimotor contingencies. However, the mechanistic basis of sensorimotor contingencies and
their mastery has remained unclear. Sensorimotor theory also struggles to explain instances of perception, such as
synesthesia, that appear to lack perceptual presence and for which relevant sensorimotor contingencies are
difﬁcult to identify. On alternative “predictive processing” theories, perceptual content emerges from
probabilistic inference on the external causes of sensory signals, however, this view has addressed neither the
problem of perceptual presence nor synesthesia. Here, I describe a theory of predictive perception of sensorimotor
contingencies which (1) accounts for perceptual presence in normal perception, as well as its absence in
synesthesia, and (2) operationalizes the notion of sensorimotor contingencies and their mastery. The core idea
is that generative models underlying perception incorporate explicitly counterfactual elements related to how
sensory inputs would change on the basis of a broad repertoire of possible actions, even if those actions are not
performed. These “counterfactually-rich” generative models encode sensorimotor contingencies related to
repertoires of sensorimotor dependencies, with counterfactual richness determining the degree of perceptual
presence associated with a stimulus. While the generative models underlying normal perception are typically
counterfactually rich (reﬂecting a large repertoire of possible sensorimotor dependencies), those underlying
synesthetic concurrents are hypothesized to be counterfactually poor. In addition to accounting for the
phenomenology of synesthesia, the theory naturally accommodates phenomenological differences between a
range of experiential states including dreaming, hallucination, and the like. It may also lead to a new view of the
(in)determinacy of normal perception.
Keywords: Predictive coding; Presence; Sensorimotor contingencies; Veridicality; Counterfactuals; Synesthesia; Active
inference; Bayesian brain.
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How can it be true, as I think it is, that we are
perceptually aware, when we look at a tomato, of
the parts of the tomato which, strictly speaking, we
do not perceive. This is the puzzle of perceptual
presence.
(Noë, 2006, p. 414)
In this quote Alva Noë identiﬁes a central challenge
for theories of perception. In normal circumstances
perceptual content is characterized by subjective
veridicality; that is, the objects of perception are
experienced as real, as belonging to the world.
When we perceive the tomato we perceive it as an
externally existing object with a back and sides, not
simply as a speciﬁc view—a “perspectival take”—on
an external scene (Noë, 2004). Subjective veridicality
—or “perceptual presence”—may seem sufﬁciently
obvious to not require explanation, but this
assumption is readily challenged by well-established
examples of perception in which raw sensory
experience (“qualia”) remains but perceptual
presence is lacking. These include afterimages, some
forms of hallucination, and—as we will see—
synesthesia.
According to Noë, perceptual presence is
explained by a “sensorimotor theory” on which
perception depends on a practical mastery of
sensorimotor dependencies or “sensorimotor
contingencies” (SMCs) (O’Regan & Noë, 2001).
The theory inherits from Gibsonian notions of
“affordances” (Gibson, 1979) and from enactive
cognitive science (Thompson & Varela, 2001) which
stress the importance of brain-body-world interactions
in cognitive processes. On sensorimotor theory, the
perception of a tomato as a (perceptually present, real,
subjectively veridical) tomato is given by practical
mastery of the SMCs governing how the sensory
responses elicited by the tomato will behave in a
variety of situations. A strong point of this theory is
that it suggests why there are differences in
qualitative character between modalities, the reason
being that different modalities instantiate different
SMCs (O’Regan & Noë, 2001). However,
sensorimotor theory faces two major challenges. The
ﬁrst is to specify at the level of neural mechanism
what is meant by a SMC and by their mastery. The
second is to account for instances of perception which
apparently do not involve SMCs. As we will see,
synesthesia exempliﬁes this second challenge.
An alternative and increasingly inﬂuential theory
of perception derives from the idea of the brain as a
“prediction machine” (Clark, 2013; Hohwy, 2013;
Seth, 2013). Applied to perception, this idea views
perceptual content as a form of inference about the
causes of sensory signals. In the currently popular
formulation of “predictive processing” (PP)1 or the
“Bayesian brain” this holds that perceptual content is
determined by hierarchically organized generative
(i.e., predictive) models (HGMs) of the external
causes of sensory signals, induced by a process
approximating Bayesian inference (Friston, 2009).
Perception of a tomato, on this view, involves the
brain deploying a high-level generative model
predicting the sensory responses elicited by the
tomato. In contrast to sensorimotor theory, PP
emphasizes neural mechanisms as both necessary
and sufﬁcient for perceptual experience (at least at
any particular instant). While accumulating evidence
is providing strong (though indirect) support for PP
(Bubic, von Cramon, & Schubotz, 2010; Clark, 2013;
Hohwy, 2013; Koster-Hale & Saxe, 2013; Yuille &
Kersten, 2006), the theory has until now not
addressed the key challenge of perceptual presence
as identiﬁed within sensorimotor theory. Neither has it
yet been applied to synesthesia.
Here, I address these challenges by integrating
insights from predictive processing and from
sensorimotor theory to derive a Predictive
Perception account of SensoriMotor Contingencies
(PPSMC). Adapting a recent formulation by Friston
and colleagues (Friston, Adams, Perrinet, &
Breakspear, 2012), I propose that normal (veridical)
perception is underpinned by counterfactually-rich
generative models, which means that these models
encode not only the likely causes of current sensory
inputs, but also the likely causes of those sensory
inputs predicted to occur given a large repertoire of
possible (but not necessarily executed) actions—
hence the term “counterfactual.” These
counterfactually-rich generative models add
mechanistic focus to the notion of “mastery of
sensorimotor contingencies” central to sensorimotor
theory (Noë, 2004; O’Regan & Noë, 2001). My
speciﬁc claim is that the subjective veridicality (or
perceptual presence) of normal perception depends
precisely on the counterfactual richness of the
corresponding generative models. If true, this
implies that perceptual presence will be lacking
1Following Clark (2013) in this article I use the term predictive
processing rather than the popular predictive coding, since the latter
originates in describing a data compression strategy. PP, on the
other hand, stresses the nature of hierarchical probabilistic
inference, within cortical networks, on the causes of sensory
signals, and the tight coupling of perception and action in
generating these inferences. The choice here is, however, largely
cosmetic; readers more familiar with the term “predictive coding”




























when the corresponding generative models are
counterfactually poor.
Synesthesia provides an ideal test case for the
application of PPSMC. Synesthetes enjoy a
remarkably rich perceptual world in which stimuli in
one modality (inducers) reliably induce additional
perceptual experiences (concurrents) either in the
same modality (e.g., grapheme-color synesthesia in
vision) or in a different modality (e.g., sound-vision
synesthesia) (Grossenbacher & Lovelace, 2001; Sagiv
& Frith, 2013; Ward, 2013). Synesthesia is by
deﬁnition highly consistent across time (Baron-
Cohen, Wyke, & Binnie, 1987; Eagleman, Kagan,
Nelson, Sagaram, & Sarma, 2007) and automatic
(i.e., synesthetes have little control over the onset
and appearance of a concurrent; Mattingley, 2009).
Importantly, inducers are not substituted by
concurrents; for example, music-taste synesthetes
continue to hear music as well as tasting it (Beeli,
Esslen, & Jancke, 2005). This highlights a common
but as yet unexplained feature of synesthetic
phenomenology, namely that concurrents while often
perceptually vivid (Ward, 2013; Ward, Jonas, Dienes,
& Seth, 2010) lack perceptual presence. In other
words synesthetes have intact reality-checking with
respect to their concurrents so that, unlike the
perception of an inducer (or a tomato), characteristic
synesthetic experiences are subjectively non-
veridical.
Existing theories of synesthesia do not account for
this key distinction between perceptual reality (which
synesthetic experiences often have) and subjectively
veridicality or presence (which they typically lack).
Such theories are usually based on the simple premise
that synesthesia involves additional functional co-
activation of brain regions implicated in processing
concurrents and inducers (Bargary & Mitchell, 2008;
Rouw, Scholte, & Colizoli, 2011), whether by
increased cross-activation at low levels of stimulus
processing (Ramachandran & Hubbard, 2001a) or
disinhibition or direct feedback from higher levels
(Grossenbacher & Lovelace, 2001; Hubbard, Brang,
& Ramachandran, 2011; Smilek, Dixon, Cudahy, &
Merikle, 2001). In either case the subjective non-
veridicality of synesthetic concurrents remains
unexplained. By contrast, PPSMC can account both
for the perceptual reality of synesthetic concurrents
and for the fact that, for synesthetes, these concurrents
are pre-reﬂectively not part of the “real” world (i.e.,
they lack perceptual presence). The claim is that
synesthetic concurrents depend on counterfactually-
poor generative models of their external causes, as
compared to those related to inducers, because there
is no corresponding rich world-related statistical
structure for such models to learn. In other words,
counterfactually-poor generative models encode a
smaller repertoire of likely causes of sensory inputs
conditioned on possible actions, as compared to
counterfactually-rich models. I will show that this
hypothesis accounts as well for phenomenological
distinctions differentiating synesthesia from other
perceptual modes including imagery, hallucinations,
and dreams.
The remainder of this paper is organized as
follows. I ﬁrst outline the basic conceptual structure
of PP, avoiding the detailed mathematics. I then
describe the main tenets of sensorimotor theory, and
show how counterfactual PP can operationalize the
notion of mastery of SMCs and solve the problem of
perceptual presence. This constitutes the core
contribution of PPSMC. After providing some
examples from normal perception, I turn to the
speciﬁc case of synesthesia. The subsequent sections
summarize the relevant features of this condition,
describe why it poses a serious and unresolved
challenge for sensorimotor theory, and elaborate on
a new account based on PPSMC. I then discuss how
the theory accounts for individual differences in
synesthetic phenomenology and for other unusual
perceptual experiences. The ﬁnal sections broach
broader issues including the distinction between
cortical “dominance” and “deference” (Hurley &
Noë, 2003b) and the possible indeterminacy of
normal perception. For ease of reference, Table 1






Predictive processing (PP) has a long history,
originating with the insights of Hermann von
Helmholtz and reaching recent prominence in the
“Bayesian Brain” hypothesis (see Clark, 2013;
Hohwy, 2013; Pouget, Beck, Ma, & Latham, 2013).
The basic idea is that, in order to support adaptive
responses, the brain must discover information about
the likely external causes of sensory signals, without
any direct access to these causes, using only
information in the ﬂux of the sensory signals
themselves (Friston, 2009). According to PP,
perception solves this problem via probabilistic,
knowledge-driven inference on the causes of sensory
signals. Applied to cortical networks, the concept of



























PP overturns classical notions of perception as a
largely “bottom-up” process of evidence
accumulation or feature detection. Instead, PP
proposes that perceptual content is speciﬁed by top-
down predictive signals emerging from multi-level
hierarchically-organized generative models (HGMs)
of the causes of sensory signals, which are
continually modiﬁed by bottom-up prediction error
signals communicating mismatches between
predicted and actual signals across hierarchical
levels (Friston, 2009; Lee & Mumford, 2003; see
Figure 1). In this view, even low-level ﬁne-grained
perceptual content depends on a cascade of
predictions ﬂowing from very general abstract
expectations which constrain successively more
detailed predictions.
Although unequivocal neural evidence is still
lacking (Clark, 2013; Pouget et al., 2013), PP is
supported by an encouraging convergence of ideas
and evidence from cognitive neuroscience, machine
learning, and statistical physics. From cognitive
neuroscience comes accumulating evidence that
perceptual content—and features of the underlying
neural activity—can be shaped or determined by pre-
stimulus expectations (Bubic et al., 2010; Egner,
Monti, & Summerﬁeld, 2010; Kok, Brouwer, van
Gerven, & de Lange, 2013; Kok, Rahnev, Jehee, Lau,
& de Lange, 2012; Melloni, Schwiedrzik, Muller,
Rodriguez, & Singer, 2011). For example, Egner and
colleagues showed that repetition suppression
(decreased cortical responses to familiar stimuli) is
abolished when repetitions are unexpected, an effect
compatible with PP but not predicted by standard
accounts based on adaptation or sharpening of
representations (Egner, Summerﬁeld, Trittschuh,
Monti, & Mesulam, 2008). From machine learning
and statistical physics comes the mathematical
machinery showing how hierarchical inference can be
implemented by cortical networks via approximations
to Bayesian inference (Dayan, Hinton, Neal, & Zemel,
1995; Friston, Kilner, & Harrison, 2006; Hinton &
Dayan, 1996; Lee & Mumford, 2003).
Putting the detailed mathematics aside, an
appreciation of the basic concepts is helpful. These
TABLE 1
A glossary of some of the technical terminology and abbreviations used in this paper. Order of presentation is alphabetic
Active inference An extension of PP (and part of the free energy principle), which says that agents can suppress prediction errors
by performing actions to bring about sensory states in line with predictions.
Bayesian inference A principle for estimating the probable causes of observed data (the posterior) given prior “beliefs” about these
causes, and a generative model of the likelihood of observing some data given speciﬁc priors.
Counterfactual predictive
processing
An extension of PP which says that generative models encode not only the likely causes of sensory signals, but
also the likely causes and values (and precisions) of sensory signals that would occur given a repertoire of
possible (but unexecuted) actions.
Doxastic veridicality The property that perceptual content is understood cognitively to reﬂect a property of the real world. Perceptual
content can have subjective veridicality in the absence of doxastic veridicality (e.g., in Charles Bonnet
hallucinations).
Free energy principle A generalization of PP according to which organisms minimize an upper bound on the entropy of sensory
signals (the free energy). Under speciﬁc assumptions, free energy translates to prediction error.
Grapheme-color synesthesia A common form of synesthesia in which graphemic (e.g., letter) inducing stimuli give rise to additional color
experiences (concurrents).
Hidden causes and hidden
controls
Hidden causes (controls) are causal factors responsible for sensory signals (motor actions) that are not directly
available to perception, so that their existence and behavior must be inferred.
Hierarchical generative
model (HGM)
A Bayesian implementation of PP in which posteriors at one level form the priors at one level lower, an
arrangement which allows priors to be induced from the data stream itself (“empirical” Bayes).
Objective veridicality The property that perceptual content reﬂects (at least partly) features of the real world.
Perceptual presence The phenomenological property that perceptual content is experienced as part of—as continuous with—the real
world; equivalent here to subjective veridicality.
Precision (weighting) The precision of a probability distribution is the inverse of its variance and is a measure of uncertainty.
Dynamic precision weighting (associated with attention) can modulate the balance between top-down and
bottom-up signal ﬂow: For example, low prediction-error precision corresponds to high conﬁdence in top-
down prior beliefs, so that prediction errors are less able to update these beliefs.
Predictive processing (PP) A Bayesian scheme, dating at least to Helmholtz, which conceives of perception as a process of probabilistic




SMCs describe ways in which sensory signals change given actions in speciﬁc contexts; they are “rules”
describing sensorimotor dependencies.
Sensorimotor theory A cognitive theory according to which perception is constituted by the exercise of a practical mastery of
sensorimotor skills or contingencies: On this theory, perception is an activity.
Subjective veridicality The phenomenological property that the perceptual content is experienced as being part of the real world. As




























rest on principles of Bayesian inference, which
provide a computational mechanism for estimating
the probable causes of data (the posterior) given the
observed conditional probabilities of the data
(likelihoods, i.e., the probability of observing some
data given particular causes) and prior “beliefs” about
the probable causes. In other words, Bayes’ theorem
relates a conditional probability (which can be
observed) to its inverse (which cannot be observed,
but knowledge of which is desired). While exact
Bayesian inference is computationally challenging
and often intractable, a variety of approximate
methods exist some of which have plausible
neurobiological implementations. Prominent among
these is Friston’s “free energy” framework (Friston,
2005, 2009; Friston, Daunizeau, Kilner, & Kiebel,
2010; Friston et al., 2006), which, following earlier
work by Hinton and colleagues (Dayan et al., 1995;
Hinton & Dayan, 1996), shows how hierarchically-
organized generative models (HGMs) can be induced
from data by assuming that the brain minimizes an
upper bound on the evidence for this data (this is the
“free energy,” a quantity derived from statistical
physics). The generalization of Bayes’ to a
hierarchical scenario implies that posteriors at one
level form the priors at one level lower, thus
enabling a form of bootstrapping with respect to the
priors—this is the idea of “empirical Bayes” that
enables priors to be induced from the data stream
itself.
Several aspects of PP applied to brain function are
particularly relevant to sensorimotor theory and to
synesthesia. First, an important implication of PP is
the existence of a strong continuity between
perception and imagination or imagery (Albright,
2012; Clark, 2012) (see also later). As emphasized
by Hinton, to be able to perceive an object requires a
generative model capable of autonomously creating,
in a top-down fashion, ﬁctive (i.e., surrogate) sensory
signals that could originate from that object (Hinton,
2007). More generally, the key role of top-down
predictive or generative models in perception points
to a strong continuity not only with imagery but also
with associative recall, dreaming, and other self-
generated perceptual or quasi-perceptual states. As
we will see later, the formation of strong
associations via correlated sensory input (or via
neonatally undifferentiated generative models) may
induce HGMs that predict intra- or inter-modal
ﬁctive sensations associated with inducing stimuli
which could in turn account for the existence of
synesthetic concurrents.
Second, key to PP is the minimization of
prediction error (or free energy) as a means of
determining the most likely causes of sensory
signals. Crucially, this can be accomplished in two
ways: HGMs can be changed to accommodate
unexpected sensory signals (perceptual inference and
learning) or actions can be performed to conﬁrm
sensory predictions (active inference) (Friston, 2009;
Friston et al., 2010). In most interpretations of PP, and
especially in the free energy framework, these
processes are understood to happen simultaneously
and continuously. Actions themselves can be
Figure 1. A schematic of hierarchical PP across three cortical regions; the “lowest” on the left (R1) and the “highest” on the right (R3).
Bottom-up (red) projections originate from “error units” (orange) in superﬁcial cortical layers and terminate on “state units” (light blue) in the
deep (infragranular) layers of their targets, while top-down (dark blue) projections conveying predictions originate in deep layers and project to
superﬁcial layers of their targets. Both prediction error signals and predictions are characterized by precisions (inverse variances) which
determine the relative inﬂuence of top-down and bottom-up signal ﬂow (see also Figure 2). Top-down precision weighting (dashed lines) is
equivalent to modulating the post-synaptic gain of prediction-error projection neurons, possibly involving dopaminergic and cholinergic
neuromodulation. Triangles represent pyramidal cells; circles represent inhibitory interneurons. Figure adapted from Friston (2009).



























considered as arising from the fulﬁlment of
proprioceptive predictions (minimization of
proprioceptive prediction error) via motor reﬂexes
(Friston et al., 2010). The close coupling of
perception and action in this framework implies that
PP involves the induction of HGMs that predict the
dynamics of sensorimotor interactions, providing a
link to the notion of “sensorimotor contingencies”
(SMCs; Clark, 2012; K. Friston, 2012; O’Regan &
Noë, 2001). We will see later that the concept of
active inference is critical in understanding the role
of counterfactual probability densities in PPSMC.
Third, generative models underlying perception and
action in PP are hierarchical, with higher levels
encoding more abstract, contextual, and multi- or
amodal aspects of sensorimotor interactions.
Importantly, the inﬂuence of prediction errors shaping
posteriors and updating priors can differ across
hierarchical levels leading to distinct consequences for
perception and action (Adams, Stephan, Brown, Frith,
& Friston, 2013; Edwards, Adams, Brown, Parees, &
Friston, 2012). For example, if low-level sensory
prediction errors have weak inﬂuence as compared to
high-level prediction errors (e.g., by precision
weighting, see below), posterior distributions
specifying perceptual content will be strongly
inﬂuenced by low-level priors. This is because these
priors will be able to reshape high-level predictions on
the basis of highly weighted prediction errors reaching
high levels, while the low-level priors themselves will
be relatively resistant to reshaping given the weak
inﬂuence of low-level prediction errors.
Fourth, and relatedly, predictions and prediction errors
within PP are associated with precisions (inverse
variances, i.e., a measure of uncertainty). Controlling
precisions provides a mechanism by which the inﬂuence
of sensory (or motor) prediction errors on perceptual (or
proprioceptive) predictions can be modulated rapidly and
ﬂexibly at speciﬁc hierarchical levels. Higher precision of
prediction errors implies increasing their gain or
weighting, and so enhances their impact on posterior
distributions (see Figure 2). Note that precision is
different from accuracy: A prediction can be precise but
inaccurate, imprecise but accurate, or indeed any other
combination. In hierarchical settings agents will have
expectations about precisions which can translate into
changes in precision weighting (Feldman & Friston,
2010; Hohwy, 2012), the optimization of which has
been associated with attention (Feldman & Friston,
2010). Abnormal precision weighting has been
suggested to underlie a variety of unusual perceptual
states including psychotic hallucinations (Adams et al.,
2013; Fletcher & Frith, 2009) and functional and motor




An alternative view on the nature of perception is
provided by “sensorimotor theory” (Noë, 2004;
O’Regan & Noë, 2001). On the sensorimotor view,
perceptual content is determined by a practical “know
how” or “mastery” of sensorimotor dependencies or
“sensorimotor contingencies” (SMCs). As O’Regan
and Noë put it:
[S]eeing is a skillful activity whereby one explores
the world, drawing on one’s mastery of the relevant
laws of sensorimotor contingency.
(O’Regan & Noë, 2001, p. 966)
For example, on sensorimotor theory the conscious
visual experience of redness is given by practical2
mastery of the SMCs governing how red things
behave under a variety of situations. Note that
sensorimotor theory associates conscious perception
speciﬁcally with the mastery of SMCs, not just with
their online operation (Noë, 2004). Even more so than
the PP view just outlined, sensorimotor theory
emphasizes the close coupling of perception and
action. However, unlike the PP view, and despite the
attention the theory has received over many years,
Figure 2. The inﬂuence of precisions on Bayesian inference and
predictive processing. A. High precision-weighting of sensory
signals (red) enhances its inﬂuence on the posterior (green) and
expectation (black dashed line) as compared to the prior (blue). B.
Low precision-weighting of sensory signals as compared to priors
has the opposite effect on posteriors and expectations.
2Proponents of sensorimotor theory are careful to emphasize
that the “knowledge” assumed by the theory is practical or
procedural rather than being of propositional declarative form
(whether explicit or tacit). (See Noë, 2004, pp.65–66). So-called
“radical enactivists” claim that even procedural knowledge is too
liberal—rather, the knowledge has to be exercised in ongoing




























possible neural or mechanistic implementations
remain unspeciﬁed (except in highly reduced
computational simulations, see e.g., Buhrmann, Di
Paolo, & Barandarian, 2013, or in abstract color
spaces, Philipona & O’Regan, 2006). In addition,
the existence of synesthesia has long presented a
challenge to sensorimotor theory in its purest form
(Gray, 2003; Hurley & Noë, 2003a; Noë & Hurley,
2003). This is because the phenomenal character of a
concurrent (e.g., the color of a grapheme) seems to
have little to do with the SMCs underwriting the
perception of the inducer. Gray highlights the “alien
colour effect” as particularly troublesome for
sensorimotor theory (Gray, 2003). This occurs when
“colored-hearing” synesthetes experience an
incongruent (visual) color concurrent on hearing an
(auditory) color-name inducer (e.g., the heard word
“red” might elicit a concurrent visual experience of
the color green; see also Gray et al., 2006). According
to Gray, this type of synesthetic association would not
just be irrelevant to, but would actively interfere with,
ongoing sensorimotor dependencies—consider the
confusion that would be occasioned by hearing the
phrase “a red bus is approaching”—so that such
associations should be eliminated as SMCs are
“mastered.” Interestingly, while conceding that
sensorimotor theory is indeed challenged by
synesthesia, Hurley and Noë do suggest that
synesthetic color experiences may be phenomenally
distinct from normal color experiences, a line of
argument developed here as well. One item of
empirical evidence consistent with this is that, in
tests of visual search, synesthetic concurrents do not
“pop-out” in the same way as happens in normal
perception (Edquist, Rich, Brinkman, & Mattingley,
2006; Laeng, Svartdal, & Oelmann, 2004; Sagiv,
Heer, & Robertson, 2006; Ward et al., 2010).
On the other hand, sensorimotor theory offers a
valuable and distinctive perspective on subjective
veridicality, or perceptual presence, which as
mentioned marks a key difference between normal
and synesthetic perceptual experience (even staunch
critics of sensorimotor theory might agree with this,
see for example, Block, 2005). On this theory,
veridical perceptual scenes are world-revealing:
They comprise a world of objects rather than
“perspectival takes” on objects, as exempliﬁed by
the quote from Noë with which this paper began.
The solution offered by sensorimotor theory is that
the experience of the tomato as an object is given by
an implicit knowledge of the ways in which our
perspectival takes would alter subsequent visual
inputs. In other words, we know, at some level, how
moving our eyes and our bodies would reveal
additional sensory information about the tomato, and
it is this knowledge—what Noë and O’Regan call
“mastery” of SMCs—that endows perceptual
presence to our experience of the tomato as a
tomato-object, with its immediately given subjective
veridicality. Importantly, this knowledge is typically
“sub-personal” in the sense that it need not be in the
form of explicitly held or declarable beliefs (Roberts,
2009). This view aligns strongly with the general
tradition of enactive perception according to which
experience is intrinsically tied up with motor
dispositions, such that perceptual content is
constitutively dependent on brain-body-world
interactions (Noë, 2004).
What could it mean, in terms of neurocognitive
processes, to have knowledge or mastery of the SMCs
underlying perceptual presence? Recall that according
to PP, perception depends on the operation of HGMs
of hidden (external) causes that best explain changing
patterns of sensory inputs, driven by the minimization
of prediction error between counter-ﬂowing top-down
predictions and bottom-up sensory evidence.
Prediction error can be reduced either by changing
the content of the HGM, or (simultaneously and
continuously) by performing actions to bring about
sensory input in-line with current predictions. These
models can therefore be understood to instantiate sub-
personal knowledge about perception-action
couplings relevant to SMCs (Clark, 2012; Friston,
2012).3
However, the notion of mastery of SMCs relevant
to perceptual presence seems to suggest the
involvement of more than just a generative model
predicting ongoing sensorimotor ﬂow. The
incorporation of an explicitly conditional (or even
meta-conditional) aspect seems essential: Were this
(rather than that) action to be performed, then this
(and not that) would be the most likely causes of the
sensory signals that would be likely to occur. One
way to accommodate this essential conditionality
within a PP framework is to consider that HGMs
could encode counterfactual probabilities. That is,
3An interesting implication of PP in this context is that it
captures the close coupling of sensation and action emphasized by
enactive approaches such as sensorimotor theory but without
endorsing the strongly enactivist (or “extended mind”) view that
the local material vehicles (the “minimal supervenience base”) for
perception or consciousness could extend beyond the boundaries of
the skull. On the PP view, even if the structure of HGMs depends
on the causal structure of the environment, the HGMs themselves
are encoded purely in neuronal mechanisms in the brain so that the
local material vehicles of perceptual experiences remain fully
intracranial. (See Block, 2005; Clark, 2012; D. Ward, 2012 for
further discussion of these issues.)



























HGMs not only represent the most likely hidden
causes of current sensory input, they also encode
how sensory inputs would change on the basis of a
repertoire of possible actions, even if those actions are
not performed. In other words, HGMs encoding
conditional aspects of SMCs would incorporate
explicitly counterfactual probabilistic models of the
behavior of hidden causes of ﬁctive sensory signals
(and their precisions) given particular actions. This
extended interpretation of PP can be called Predictive
Perception of SensoriMotor Contingencies (PPSMC).
It is strikingly compatible with Noë’s view of
perceptual experience:
Qualities are available in experience as possibilities,
as potentialities, but not as complete givens.
Experience is a dynamic process of navigating the
pathways of these possibilities.
(Noë, 2006, p. 428).4
Helpfully, the notion of counterfactual probabilistic
models has already been proposed within Friston’s
free-energy framework, where they are used to
model saccadic eye-movements as tests of
perceptual hypotheses (Friston, 2012; Friston et al.,
2012). In this view, saccades are guided on the basis
of prior beliefs about which movements would
maximize precision or conﬁdence (minimize
uncertainty) in perceptual predictions. This entails a
generative model of how the world is actively
sampled which explicitly incorporates counterfactual
probability distributions about the sensory
consequences of possible actions, where these
models encode conditional predictions about sensory
values and their associated precisions.
Consider an example, adapted from Friston et al.
(2012). Imagine that you are sitting in a garden and
notice some ﬂuttering movements in your visual
periphery. Your brain forms the hypothesis
(mediated by a HGM) that the ﬂuttering is caused
by a bird. This minimizes the associated prediction
errors and induces a perceptual state including a
peripherally-located bird (perhaps with some
phenomenal indeterminacy, see later). This, so far, is
standard PP applied to perception. The next step is
that the brain selects prior beliefs about gaze direction
that will minimize the uncertainty about the current
HGM related to the peripheral ﬂuttering. This
selection depends on conditional expectations of the
precision of counterfactual aspects of the HGM (i.e.,
predictions about how precisions would change given
a repertoire of possible actions). As mentioned, this
entails that the HGM explicitly encodes
counterfactual predictions about sensory values and
associated precisions (and their likely hidden causes),
where the term counterfactual refers to the speciﬁc
sense of possible but non-actualized situations.
For Friston, the next step is that the selected priors
will produce proprioceptive predictions related to the
oculomotor system and (counterfactual) sensory
predictions about the visual consequences of
executing the saccade. Finally, action will fulﬁl the
proprioceptive predictions (via oculomotor reﬂexes
that minimize proprioceptive prediction errors)
leading to foveation of the bird and—if indeed a
bird is foveated—the uncertainty in the bird-related
HGM will be reduced (minimized).
It is important to say exactly what is distinctive
about PPSMC as compared to standard predictive
coding (e.g., Rao & Ballard, 1999) and active
inference (Friston, Mattout, & Kilner, 2011). Standard
predictive coding involves the predictive modeling of
sensory responses and does not care about the impact
of actions on these responses, so counterfactual
probability densities are not implicated. Active
inference says that sensory prediction errors can be
suppressed by performing actions to conﬁrm
perceptual predictions. In this sense, counterfactual
probability densities are implicit in dynamics of
priors predicting the sensory consequences of actions.
In contrast to both (and leveraging the framework of
Friston, 2012; Friston et al., 2012), PPSMC requires
that counterfactual predictions be explicitly
incorporated as part of the priors in a HGM. That is,
a counterfactually-rich HGM will model predicted
future states (sensory signals, their external causes,
and associated precisions) under a broad repertoire of
different “controls” (those signals, not directly
accessible to an agent, that cause movements). The
explicit encoding of precisions and precision
expectations within counterfactual components of the
model can be used to guide action selection via criteria
such as maximization, as described above (Friston,
2012; Friston et al., 2012). However, they can also be
considered as underpinning fundamental aspects of
perceptual phenomenology, as I argue next. To put it
more simply, active inference is roughly equivalent to
the concept of a SMC, while PPSMC operationalizes
the notion of mastery or knowledge of SMCs within
sensorimotor theory.
In this light, and as already suggested, PPSMC
leads to a view of perception that directly addresses
4There is an interesting link here to Tononi’s “integrated
information theory of consciousness” which proposes that any
given conscious scene has the property of being conscious partly
in virtue of ruling out a vast repertoire of alternative possibilities,
regardless of whether these alternatives have ever actually occurred




























Noë’s puzzle of perceptual presence, the puzzle that
we can be perceptually aware of parts of an object
that strictly speaking we do not directly perceive. As
Friston puts it:
Being able to predict what is currently seen also
enables us to predict ﬁctive sensations that we
could experience from another viewpoint
(Friston et al., 2012, p. 17)
Putting all this together, I suggest that perceptual
presence is underpinned by the engagement of
counterfactually-rich HGMs within the framework
of PP. We experience normal perception as world-
revealing precisely because the generative models
underlying perceptual content specify a rich
repertoire of explicit counterfactual probability
densities encoding (mastery of) SMCs. Importantly,
this departs from standard versions of sensorimotor
theory which, in contrast to PP, are explicitly non-
inferential (Noë, 2004). It also bears clarifying that
this application of counterfactual HGMs differs from
that offered by Friston and colleagues, who—while
recognizing similarities between active inference and
SMCs (Friston, 2012) do not equate counterfactual PP
with the notion of mastery of SMCs (as done here),
and are concerned speciﬁcally (at least so far) with
understanding active perceptual sampling, rather than
with the phenomenology of perceptual presence.
Presence, precision expectations,
and action
It is worth taking a few lines to clarify the roles of
precision expectations and action in the above
account of perceptual presence. To rehearse, the
contention is that the subjective veridicality
(perceptual presence) associated with perceptual
content is underpinned by the counterfactual
richness of the corresponding HGMs, where richness
refers to the range of conditional sensorimotor
relations that are counterfactually encoded. This
means that particular content (e.g., a bird, a tomato)
will be experienced as perceptually present to the
extent that the corresponding HGM encodes a rich
repertoire of predicted sensory signals (and their
associated precisions and likely external causes)
conditioned on possible actions.
If counterfactual predictions have low expected
precision, one might wonder how they could modify
current perceptual content, since low precision
prediction errors generally do not lead to updating
of higher-level priors. However, it is important to
distinguish between perceptual content (which is
dependent on non-counterfactual aspects of the
HGM that can be updated or modulated by high
precision prediction errors) and perceptual presence,
which (on this account) depends on the richness of
counterfactually-encoded sensorimotor dependencies.
Thus, low-precision counterfactual predictions can
still modulate the perceptual presence associated
with a speciﬁc content according to their richness
and structure. On the other hand, counterfactual
expectations of high precision can drive action, as
described above in the example of saccade
generation. However, on the present view, action is
not constitutively necessary for perceptual presence;
that is, it is possible to have a rich repertoire of
counterfactual predictions endowing a high level of
perceptual presence to some content, without any of
these predictions simultaneously driving action. This
means that one can experience an object as
perceptually present without being driven to walk
around it.
Examples of PPSMC
As a further illustration of the impact of
counterfactual richness on perception, consider how
we experience images.5
In Magritte’s classic painting (see Figure 3), we are
invited to reﬂect on the image of a pipe as precisely
that—an image, and not a real pipe in the proximate
world. What accounts for the image-like experience,
in contrast to the subjectively veridical experience of
pipe-ness that would be occasioned by visual
exposure to a real pipe? According to PPSMC, the
SMCs governing our interaction with an image of a
pipe are very different (and substantially less rich)
than those that would govern our interactions with
an actual pipe. Images certainly change as a function
of selective sampling, but they change in very
different ways than do the referent. However
ﬂexibly we might inspect Figure 3 we would not be
able to directly examine the rear of the depicted pipe.
Thus, the best HGMs to account for our interaction
with the image are those that entail selection of a
high-level prior of image-hood, which would specify
a distinct and impoverished repertoire of
intermediate-level counterfactual probability
densities (with respect to the sensory and precision
consequences of possible actions regarding the pipe
5I am grateful to Tom Froese for introducing this example as
relevant to synesthesia. Though not for the licensing fees that
subsequently were incurred.



























referent) as compared to a high-level prior of object-
hood.
A second example, adapted from Noë (2004)
involves the perception of ellipses and circles.
Inspection of Figure 4A (while avoiding looking at
4B) should elicit the perceptual content of (an image
of) an ellipse, for that is what is there. Inspection of
Figure 4B, however, involves both the visual
impression of an ellipse and of a circular form,
thanks to the perspectival context given by the rest
of the picture. On the face of it this is puzzling: In
some sense, we see both an ellipse and a circle given
the same sensory impressions. Sensorimotor theory
would explain this by saying that in Figure 4B we
recognize a richer repertoire of SMCs than in Figure
4A. Roughly the same explanation applies for
PPSMC. The additional context available in Figure
4B engages a high-level prior of object-hood (albeit
within an image, see above) which activates a broader
repertoire of intermediate-level counterfactual
probability densities that in turn underpins the
experience of a perceptually present circular image.
In contrast, for Figure 4A we have only the SMCs
activated by the superﬁcial elliptical shape.
Interim summary
The hierarchical generative models (HGMs) proposed
within predictive processing provide a natural way to
operationalize the idea of sensorimotor contingencies
described within sensorimotor theory. This is because,
within predictive processing, generative models are
induced by minimization of prediction errors as a
result of both perception and active inference, thus
bringing together perception and action. Extending
this idea, counterfactually-rich generative models
explicitly encode the conditional nature emphasized
by the mastery of sensorimotor contingencies relevant
to the puzzle of perceptual presence. That is, a
counterfactually-rich hierarchical generative model
explicitly encodes probabilistic representations of the
external causes and expected values and precisions of
ﬁctive sensations conditioned on a repertoire of
possible actions, thus capturing the key notion
within sensorimotor theory of somehow perceiving
parts of an object not directly available within the
ongoing sensorimotor ﬂux. This theory of predictive
processing of sensorimotor contingencies (PPSMC)
uniﬁes two distinct traditions of thinking about
perception and in doing so is well placed to account
for some otherwise puzzling phenomena. Prominent
among these is synesthesia, which I now turn to as an
illuminating test case for PPSMC.
PPSMC AND SYNESTHESIA
The existence of synesthetic
concurrents
As mentioned, sensorimotor theory has struggled to
account for synesthesia because the perceptually real
nature of concurrents (at least for projector subtypes,
see later) is apparently inconsistent with the SMCs
underwriting perception of the inducing stimuli (Gray,
2003; Gray et al., 2006; Hurley & Noë, 2003a; Noë &
Hurley, 2003). PPSMC, on the other hand, provides a
way to understand both the existence of synesthetic
concurrents and their usually overlooked subjective
non-veridicality (lack of perceptual presence).
On any PP account, perception depends on
probabilistic inference of the likely external (hidden)
causes of sensory signals. This should hold true for
synesthetic concurrents as well. This means that
HGMs that encode (predict) inducers as causes of
the corresponding (veridical) sensory inputs must
also encode (predict) the inexistent sensory inputs
(and their likely causes, and precisions)
corresponding to the concurrent. Following general
Figure 3. Rene Magritte’s The Treachery of Images (1928–1929).
© ADAGP, Paris and DACS, London 2014.
Figure 4. A. A context-free ellipse, underlying the visual
impression of an image of an ellipse. B. A context-laden ellipse,
underlying the visual impression of images of both an ellipse and of
a circular form, as a result of enriched counterfactual SMCs.




























associationist principles (Albright, 2012; James,
1890), it is plausible that these additional
components to a predictive model emerge via
associative processes during development and
learning, possibly facilitated by genetic
predispositions leading to structural cross-wiring
(Bargary & Mitchell, 2008). On this view, reliable
(inter- and intra-modal) correlations in sensory
signals will induce generative models that predict
their co-occurrence via a single set of external
causes. An alternative but also associationist view is
that humans are born with strong cross-modal
associations which are pruned away or inhibited
during development. This “neonatal synesthesia”
hypothesis implies that different sensory modalities
have to be “learned” during development in order to
be separated (Maurer & Mondloch, 2006). On this
view, HGMs underlying perception are initially
highly multimodal, encoding strong priors on cross-
modal correlations which are selectively weakened
over time, but less so for synesthetes than
neurotypics. A third alternative is that there may be
a short developmental window in which synesthetic
correspondences could be “burned in” by even single
salient events involving novel associations coupled to
reward or emotional salience. It is not necessary here
to arbitrate among these positions (see Deroy &
Spence, 2013): What matters is that there is good
evidence for associationist accounts of cross- and
intra-modal perceptual associative learning, relevant
highlights of which are summarized next.
At the behavioral level, intra-modal and cross-
modal associations, both innate and learned, have
well-established effects on perceptual experience.
For example, in the famous McGurk effect (McGurk
& MacDonald, 1976), the visual appearance of
moving lips can strongly inﬂuence the auditory
experience of a clearly spoken phoneme. There is
compelling evidence of cross-modal perceptual
correspondences even in non-human animals:
Chimpanzees are better at classifying bright stimuli
when they are presented along with high-pitched
sounds as compared to low-pitched sounds,
suggesting an association between brightness and
pitch similar to that observed in humans (Ludwig,
Adachi, & Matsuzawa, 2011). In a related study of
neurotypic humans, smoothness, softness, and
roundness of stimuli positively correlated with
luminance of a preferred color; smoothness and
softness also positively correlated with the color
itself (Ludwig & Simner, 2013). Moreover, tactile
sensations were associated with speciﬁc colors (e.g.,
softness with pink). This again suggests the existence
of cross-modal associations which could underwrite
synesthetic concurrents via their encoding in
multimodal HGMs. Interestingly, Deroy and Spence
suggest in a recent review that cross-modal
correspondences underlying synesthesia may be
grounded in sensorimotor associations. For example,
angular and round visual shapes are usually
associated with non-words “takete” and “maluma”
respectively, supporting the idea that the sharp vocal
transitions engaged when vocalizing “takete” map
onto visually sharp angular transitions (and vice-
versa for “maluma”) (Deroy & Spence, 2013). This
idea, which recalls some earlier suggestions (e.g.,
Ramachandran & Hubbard, 2001b), ﬁts nicely with
that of cross-modal correspondences being encoded in
predictive models of SMCs.
More direct behavioral evidence has been sought
by recent studies which have employed associative
training regimes to induce forms of synesthesia in
neurotypical subjects (Colizoli, Murre, & Rouw,
2012; Kusnir & Thut, 2012; Meier & Rothen, 2009;
Rothen, Wantz, & Meier, 2011). While the results of
these studies are mixed, at least some behavioral
criteria for synesthesia are met following training.
For example, trained grapheme-color associations
have been shown to elicit Stroop effects similar to
those observed in natural synesthetes, although
performance was unchanged on more perceptually
oriented tasks such as perceptual crowding (Colizoli
et al., 2012; Meier & Rothen, 2009). In one very
recent study employing a highly demanding training
regime, a majority of subjects reported the appearance
of subjective synesthetic concurrents even outside the
laboratory, although not consistently (Bor and
colleagues, unpublished data).
At the neural level, learned associations have clear
effects on neural responses. Importantly, these effects
generalize beyond so-called “association” (infero-
temporal, IT) cortex. In a classic study, Schlack and
Albright trained macaques to associate static images
of arrows with moving dot patterns and found that,
after training, neurons in cortical area MT which
normally respond only to movement also responded
to the static images, and furthermore, that these
neurons showed an orientation tuning to arrow
direction corresponding to their “natural” tuning
curves for motion (Schlack & Albright, 2007). They
interpreted this activity as a neural correlate of visual
imagery of motion evoked by top-down recall, an
interpretation consistent with a role for top-down
predictive signaling in eliciting concurrent-related
perceptual content. A wide range of similar neural
evidence is surveyed in (Albright, 2012). In humans,
the neural underpinnings of cross-modal
correspondences are perhaps less well characterized.



























One recent study identiﬁed the involvement of right
intraparietal cortex in a similar though not identical
location to that implicated in synesthesia (Bien, ten
Oever, Goebel, & Sack, 2012). Other lines of
evidence show that stimuli presented in one
modality can modulate (de Haas, Schwarzkopf,
Urner, & Rees, 2013; Noesselt et al., 2010) or elicit
(Liang, Mouraux, Hu, & Iannetti, 2013; Luo, Liu, &
Poeppel, 2010) speciﬁc responses in other modalities.
It is now possible to say how predictive perception
could lead to the emergence and persistence of
synesthetic concurrents. The idea is that on
encountering an inducer, a synesthete’s brain
deploys a suite of generative models which predict
the external (hidden) causes of the sensory inputs
associated to the inducer, as well as those indirectly
associated to the concurrent via the synesthetic
relationship. This relationship, encoded in the HGM,
could emerge from any combination of the
associationist mechanisms outlined above. The
combined content of this HGM across hierarchical
levels generates an integrated perceptual content
incorporating both the inducer and the concurrent.
Crucially, these HGMs must be resistant to
reshaping by sensory prediction errors that would
arise when an inducer is encountered in the absence
of stimuli directly representing the concurrent. One
might suspect that concurrents should be eliminated
over time by reshaping of prior beliefs to explain
away persistent prediction errors (equivalent to the
elimination of a SMC within sensorimotor theory).
This, of course, is the worry motivating the “alien
colour effect” challenge mentioned earlier (Gray,
2003). One way to understand how this resistance
might happen is by considering precisions and the
hierarchical nature of generative models (Adams
et al., 2013; Edwards et al., 2012). The suggestion is
that synesthetic associations are encoded within
intermediate-level generative models corresponding
to associative or secondary sensory cortical
processing. These intermediate-level models are
endowed with unusually high prior precision
weighting so that these priors overwhelm
concurrent-related sensory prediction errors ﬂowing
from lower levels. These aberrant precisions may in
turn emerge from differences in associative
mechanisms differentiating synesthetes from
neurotypics, perhaps implicating differences in
attentional processing. At the same time, these
intermediate-level models pass on precise prediction
errors to higher-level models that are trying to explain
concurrent-related percepts that they did not predict.
These higher-level models are reshaped over time to
predict the synesthetic percepts in a context-sensitive
fashion, which is consistent with the context
dependency of many synesthetic phenomena (Ward,
2013). This account is just one among a variety of
possible mechanisms6 which could assure resistance
of synesthetic HGMs to reshaping by prediction error
signals by calling on aberrant encoding of precisions
and precision-weighting.
The subjective non-veridicality of
synesthetic concurrents
The key phenomenological property of the subjective
non-veridicality of synesthetic concurrents can now
be explained by appealing to differences between the
counterfactual richness of the HGMs associated with
inducers and concurrents. For inducers (and in normal
perception), perceptual content depends on
counterfactually-rich HGMs of the behavior of
hidden causes of ﬁctive sensory signals in response
to hidden controls relating to possible actions. In
contrast, for concurrents, the corresponding HGMs
are hypothesized to be counterfactually poor
because the hidden causes giving rise to concurrent-
related sensory signals do not embed a rich and deep
statistical structure for the brain to learn (i.e., to
encode into counterfactual representations). In
particular, there is very little sense in which
concurrent percepts depend on active sampling of
their hidden causes. (For example, synesthetic visual
responses to music are unaffected by shutting or
moving the eyes; Ward, 2013). According to
PPSMC, this comparative counterfactual poverty
explains why synesthetic concurrents are
subjectively non-veridical.
The hierarchical nature of generative models in
perception again comes into play here. Just as high-
level models learn to predict the concurrent-related
perceptual hypotheses of intermediate-level models
(see above), high-level models may also learn to
predict the counterfactual poverty of these
intermediate-level models. That is, the subjective
non-veridicality of synesthetic concurrents gets built
right into the structure of the generative model as a
result of high-level models trying to predict the
6Another possibility is that counterfactually shallow aspects of
HGMs may be inherently resistant to reshaping by prediction errors
since there is less encoded “causal structure” to be revised, as
compared to counterfactually-rich HGMs (Jakob Howhy, personal
communication). By the same token, counterfactually shallow
HGMs may be less effective in driving actions to generate the





























behavior of hidden causes at (counterfactually-poor)
intermediate levels.
In short, for concurrents, there is only a very weak
sense in which generative models hierarchically
encode the counterfactual probability distributions
reﬂecting ﬁctive sensations (and their likely external
causes and precisions) conditioned on possible
actions, where these distributions are exactly those
which correspond to the notion of perceptual
presence (subjective veridicality) described within
sensorimotor theory.7
Let’s consider a concrete example, contrasting a
sensorimotor account of the (normal) perception of a
tomato with grapheme-color synesthesia. On
sensorimotor theory, to perceive the tomato is to
have mastery of corresponding SMCs. That is, we
have a sense of the perceptual presence of the whole
tomato because we (sub-personally) know how to
move our eyes and bodies in order to obtain more
information about it. This account, however, struggles
to explain grapheme-color synesthesia because there
seem to be few or no relevant SMCs related to
concurrents (Gray, 2003; Hurley & Noë, 2003a). On
a PP account, we perceive the tomato as a tomato
because HGMs induce higher-order invariants
relevant to object-hood (Clark, 2012). In this view
SMCs reﬂect deeply layered hierarchical models of
hidden causes of sensory signals. The key new move
in PPSMC is to propose that HGMs underlying
perception explicitly encode mastery of SMCs as
counterfactual probability densities: i.e., predictions
of ﬁctive sensations (and their expected precisions
and likely external causes) conditioned on speciﬁc
inferential sampling actions, and that this underlies
the phenomenology of presence (or its absence). Our
perception of the tomato (or inducer) is
counterfactually rich, involving deeply layered
probabilistic models of how possible actions could
lead to changes in values and precisions of sensory
signals. This richness leads to the tomato being
perceived as perceptually present, available, and
externally real. By contrast, the synesthetic
perception of a concurrent is counterfactually poor,
lacking any deep hierarchical structure linking
possible actions to ﬁctive sensory signals and
precisions, which leads to it being perceived as
unreal and as lacking in external object-hood.
Projector and associator synesthesia
subtypes
There is considerable individual variability among
synesthetes in the phenomenology of concurrents
and in inducer-concurrent relationships. Within
grapheme-color synesthesia, one relatively common
(though still controversial) distinction is between
projector subtypes—who experience concurrents as
occupying speciﬁc extra-personal spatial locations,
usually but not always co-located with their inducers
—and associator subtypes, who experience
concurrents with an ill-deﬁned or absent spatiality
(Dixon, Smilek, & Merikle, 2004; Rouw & Scholte,
2010). Typically, projectors report their concurrents as
being more perceptually vivid than do associators. At
the limit, associators may be equivocal about whether
there is any speciﬁc phenomenology at all, beyond an
involuntary and automatic conceptual association
(Ward, Li, Salih, & Sagiv, 2007).
The distinction or continuum between projectors
and associators in grapheme-color synesthesia is
naturally accommodated by the present theory. For
associators, the lack of spatial speciﬁcity negates an
entire set of SMCs that would otherwise be brought to
bear, whether for inducers or (projected) concurrents.
This further constrains the counterfactual richness of
the underlying HGMs, leading to a further diminution
of perceptual presence and, toward the extremes,
attenuation of the perceptual reality of the
concurrent (shading ever further towards imagery). It
could even be argued that the issue of perceptual
presence only really emerges in the case of
projectors, for whom there is a salient
phenomenological contrast in this dimension
between the appearance of inducers and concurrents.
Other forms of synesthesia
A great variety of synesthetic conditions have been
documented besides the canonical case of grapheme-
color synesthesia. A prominent example is mirror-
touch synesthesia in which observed touch on
another elicits the sensation of being touched
(Banissy, Cohen Kadosh, Maus, Walsh, & Ward,
2009). This form of synesthesia unsurprisingly, has
been linked to the operation of the mirror neuron
system (Banissy et al., 2011; Mroczko-Wasowicz &
Werning, 2012), which itself yields nicely to an
interpretation in terms of PP since mirror-system
processing is effectively about predicting the sensory
consequences of observed actions (albeit with low
precision on proprioceptive prediction errors in order
7The subjective non-veridicality of synesthetic concurrents may
also be related to the “experiential blindness” proposed by Noë
(2004) to result from the donning of inverting goggles or other
devices which disrupt or destroy SMCs, as in the classic
experiments of Kohler (1951) (1964).



























to prevent explicit action mirroring or echopraxia).
Another interesting example is sound-vision
synesthesia (Ward, Huckstep, & Tsakanikos, 2006),
in which auditory inducers evoke visual concurrents.
This form of synesthesia is highly “productive” in the
sense that it is hard (perhaps impossible) to ﬁnd
sounds that do not elicit visual concurrents. Again it
seems that a PP account could apply given innate or
learned cross-modal HGMs linking sound and vision
(Ludwig et al., 2011). The productivity of sound-
vision synesthesia as compared to (for example)
grapheme-color synesthesia might be rooted in the
fact that the latter depends on learned inducers
whereas sound inducers presumably do not need to
be learned. The relative selectivity (non-
productiveness) of grapheme-color synesthesia may
(speculatively) arise because only certain graphemes
are extensively learned in association with colors.
“Spatial form” or “sequence space” synesthesia is
a relatively common variant in which numbers are
experienced as having spatial locations, usually
lying along a “number line” with a speciﬁc
arrangement in extra-personal space (Eagleman,
2009; Sagiv, Simner, Collins, Butterworth, & Ward,
2006). Like grapheme-color synesthesia, this type of
synesthesia is subjectively non-veridical in that the
spatial location and embedding of numerical
inducers is not confused with the spatial
organization and appearance of the external world.
We can again appeal to PPSMC to explain this non-
veridicality by assuming that the synesthetic spatial
embedding is comparatively counterfactually
impoverished, and that the emergence of the relevant
cross-modal correspondences may again originate in
associations implicit in both synesthetes and non-
synesthetes alike (Price & Mattingley, 2013). For
example, reaction time measures indicate a left-to-
right association with increasing magnitude
(Dehaene, Bossini, & Giraux, 1993).
Imagery in synesthetes and neurotypics
There is some evidence that synesthetes (at least in
grapheme-color synesthesia) have more vivid visual
imagery than neurotypic controls (Barnett & Newell,
2008). The overlap between perception and imagery
implied by PPSMC is consistent with this ﬁnding
inasmuch as both imagery and synesthetic
concurrents involve having higher conﬁdence in top-
down priors in the face of potentially conﬂicting
sensory error signals, perhaps as a result of low-
precision weighting of these sensory signals.
There are, however, important phenomenological
differences between imagery and synesthesia.
Imagery typically lacks perceptual reality and is
associated with experiences of volition, while
synesthesia (at least for projectors, see above) has
the opposite characteristics (Ward, 2012). Why
might this be? One possibility is that imagery
involves transient enhancement of prior precision at
high hierarchical levels, while synesthesia involves a
more permanent enhancement of prior precision at
intermediate levels (in both cases relative to
prediction error precisions). The high intermediate-
level precision for synesthesia explains the
perceptual reality of concurrents, while the reshaping
of high-level models predicting the concurrent
explains their involuntary nature (i.e., they become
expected). By contrast, transient modulation of high-
level priors is not sufﬁcient to reshape intermediate-
level models to drive perceptual reality, and neither is
there the opportunity for yet-higher-level models to
learn the properties of the levels immediately below,
so that the related experiences are associated with the
explicit engagement of these models and hence as
voluntary. (See Edwards et al., 2012 for a similar
account of the involuntary nature of many hysterical
symptoms.)
There also appears to be differences between the
nature of imagery in synesthetes and in non-
synesthetes who have strong imagery capabilities.
Notably, the latter tend to be poor at remembering
colors, while synesthetes with strong imagery tend to
be good at this task (Yaro &Ward, 2007). This suggests
that synesthetes may be more “accurate” than non-
synesthetes in both their imagery and perception,
supporting enhanced memory. This is compatible with
evidence that grapheme-color synesthetes perform better
on tests of color perception as compared to non-
synesthetes (Banissy, Walsh, & Ward, 2009; Yaro &
Ward, 2007), and with the remarkable consistency of
synesthetic concurrents, which is indeed used as an
operational criterion (Rothen, Seth, Witzel, & Ward,
2013). Possibly, these differences in color memory and
perception may emerge from compensatory increases in
prior precision for synesthetes as compared to non-
synesthetes.
Relation to other forms of perceptual
content
If the PPSMC account of perception is on the right
lines, it should be compatible with other forms of
perceptual content—besides synesthesia and imagery




























veridicality. In order to accommodate these forms it is
useful to differentiate veridicality into three sub-types:
(1) subjective (i.e., whether the perceptual content
appears, phenomenologically, as part of the external
world—recall that this is distinct from perceptual
reality which denotes the existence of a vivid
perceptual phenomenology); (2) doxastic (i.e.,
whether the perceptual content is understood
cognitively to reﬂect part of the external world); and
(3) objective (i.e., whether perceptual content, at least
to some extent, does indeed reﬂect properties of the
external world). The distinction between subjective
and doxastic veridicality is subtle but signiﬁcant.
For example, lucid dream states and certain non-
delusional hallucinations (e.g., Charles Bonnet
syndrome) involve perceptual content that appears,
perceptually or subjectively, to be continuous or
confusable with the external world (i.e., there is
perceptual presence or subjective veridicality), while
at the same time the individual retains intact reality
checking, at the (doxastic) level of beliefs, that the
content is not in fact part of external reality. On this
view, synesthetic concurrents and imagery lack all
three forms of veridicality, while the perception of
inducers has all three.
Table 2 summarizes a selection of perceptual
forms along the above dimensions. Organized this
way, it is clear that many different combinations are
possible. The claim is that, across the board, the
absence of subjective veridicality in the presence of
perceptual reality is grounded in a comparative
counterfactual poverty of the underlying HGMs.
Normal perception, as a benchmark, involves
perceptual reality and all forms of veridicality
(excluding visual illusions which may fail objective
veridicality). Dreams and many hallucinations have
both perceptual reality and subjective veridicality.
On the PPSMC theory this implies that there are
counterfactually-rich HGMs underlying the
perceptual content, which is consistent with this
content generally recapitulating content experienced
in different contexts during normal perception.
Interestingly, doxastic veridicality can be either
present (for non-lucid dreams or hallucinations
accompanied with delusions) or absent (for lucid
dreams and non-delusional hallucinations) for these
perceptual forms. The transition to doxastic
veridicality poses an interesting challenge.
Following Fletcher and Frith (2009) this may have
to do with the reshaping of higher-level abstract
priors in order to “explain away” persistent lower-
level or intermediate-level perceptual prediction
errors. As argued throughout this paper, synesthetic
concurrents (for both projectors and associators) are
characterized by a lack of subjective veridicality
grounded in counterfactually-poor HGMs. In this
regard they may be experientially similar to
afterimages which also combine perceptual reality
with subjective non-veridicality, again plausibly
because of counterfactually impoverished
generative models. Finally, imagery and associative
recall lack perceptual reality as well as all forms of
veridicality (though perceptual reality may
be maintained to a limited extent for “strong”
imagers).
Interim summary
Synesthesia involves consciously perceived cross- or
intra-modal correspondences between inducing
stimuli and concurrents. Based on PPSMC I
TABLE 2
Varieties of perceptual content differentiated by their perceptual reality, subjective veridicality, doxastic veridicality, and objective
veridicality (see main text). Hallucinations without delusions include Charles Bonnet syndrome, Lewy Body dementia, and
Parkinson’s disease dementia (Santhouse, Howard, & ffytche, 2000). Hallucinations with delusions include canonical schizophrenic
psychotic episodes as well as certain drug-induced hallucinations, including, for example, those elicited by psylocibin
Perceptual reality Subjective veridicality Doxastic veridicality Objective veridicality
Normal perception ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Dreaming (non-lucid) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗
Hallucinations (with delusions) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗
Dreaming (lucid) ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗
Hallucinations (without delusions) ✓ ✓/✗ ✗ ✗
Synesthesia (projector) ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗
Afterimages (e.g., retinal) ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗
Synesthesia (associator) ✓/✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
Imagery/associative recall ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗



























hypothesize that the existence of synesthetic
concurrents is rooted in multimodal hierarchical
generative models entailed by innate or learned
associations interacting with unusually high prior
precisions at intermediate hierarchical levels. These
associations likely reﬂect widespread neurotypic
cross- and intra-modal correspondences, and—
crucially—their subjective non-veridicality arises
because concurrent-related aspects of these
generative models lack the counterfactual richness of
those related to inducers. It remains as an outstanding
challenge to address this framework to the large
variety of synesthetic conditions, as well as—more
generally—to other perceptual states which differ
along the dimensions of perceptual realism and
veridicality.
DISCUSSION
In this section I encounter some broader issues and
open questions raised by the PPSMC and its
application to synesthesia.
Cortical dominance and cortical
deference
The relationship between sensorimotor theory and
neural activity has been used to support a distinction
between cortical dominance, in which perceptual
content is shaped by the local neuronal properties of
an activated region, and cortical deference, in which
content depends on how an area participates in
sensorimotor dependencies involving brain, body,
and environment (Hurley & Noë, 2003a).
Sensorimotor theory, as originally conceived, aligns
well with cortical deference in emphasizing that
perceptual content is a way of interacting with an
environment. Experiments using “sensory
substitution” are often highlighted in support of
cortical deference. For example, use of the Bach-y-
Rita’s famous “tactile-visual-sensory-substitution”
device (Bach-y-Rita, 1972) has been argued to lead
to “quasi-visual” perceptions despite no direct
activation of visual cortex (Hurley & Noë, 2003a).
Cortical dominance is exempliﬁed by phantom limb
syndrome where, for example, stroking of the face
may be felt as stroking of a phantom arm, reﬂecting
activation of a region of somatosensory cortex
previously dedicated to processing arm-related input
(Ramachandran & Rogers-Ramachandran, 1996).
Sensorimotor theory accounts for this instance of
cortical dominance by noting that, because an
amputated arm cannot be moved, there are no new
SMCs to be learned which would modify the
corresponding perceptual content. Accordingly,
when new phantom-related SMCs are facilitated, as
happens during “mirror-box” therapy (Ramachandran
& Rogers-Ramachandran, 1996), dominance becomes
deference and sensations are referred to the phantom
limb.
Synesthesia represents a potentially more
problematic case of cortical dominance for
sensorimotor theory, because here (in contrast to
phantom limbs) dynamical SMCs should eliminate
interfering concurrent experiences, especially in
cases like the alien colour effect (see earlier and
Gray, 2003). As mentioned, Hurley and Noë admit
the challenge posed by synesthesia. They scout a
solution by noting that synesthetic phenomenology
is distinct from normal phenomenology (though they
do not focus on veridicality), and they suggest that
concurrents may depend on a kind of “cortical
dangling” occasioned by the involvement of the
relevant cortical substrates (e.g., V4 in GCS) in
other SMCs (Hurley & Noë, 2003a; Noë & Hurley,
2003).
PPSMC suggests a more nuanced approach to the
distinction between deference, dominance, and the
relation to synesthesia. On this view, perceptual
content of all kinds is shaped by multiple interacting
brain regions encoding HGMs which predict the
dynamics of multimodal sensorimotor dependencies.
Therefore, it is only in extreme or unusual cases in
which content maps on to local neuronal substrates
independent of behavioral context (dominance) or is
fully determined by this context (deference). An
emphasis on cortical networks rather than regions
dilutes the deference/dominance distinction and is
consistent with a range of experimental evidence
mentioned earlier regarding modulation and
elicitation of multimodal cortical activity following
unimodal input (de Haas et al., 2013; Liang et al.,
2013; Luo et al., 2010; Noesselt et al., 2010), as well
as with observations of occipital cortical activation
following training on a tactile substitution device in
blind subjects (Ortiz et al., 2011). More generally, the
balance between deference and dominance in shaping
perceptual content will depend on the precision
weighting of sensory and perceptual error signals in
reshaping multimodal HGMs. The notion of “cortical
dangling” in synesthesia can therefore be given focus
as the operation of HGMs encoding inducer-
concurrent associations and their corresponding
sensorimotor dependencies, with the counterfactual
poverty of concurrent-related sensorimotor
































There is long-standing debate regarding the
determinacy of visual experience. On one side is
the notion that conscious scenes are fully
determinate, in the sense that out of a vast
repertoire of possibilities, just a single determinate
perceptual scene is experienced at any one time,
corresponding—to some degree—to a speciﬁc
interpretation of an external state-of-affairs. It is
not easy to ﬁnd explicit positive statements of this
view since it seems implicitly assumed by many
contemporary theories of consciousness. On the
other side is the idea that visual experience is
intrinsically indeterminate, at least in the periphery,
and that the apparent determinacy of perceptual
content may be illusory (Cohen & Dennett, 2011;
Kouider, de Gardelle, Sackur, & Dupoux, 2010).
This is compatible with Dennett’s argument that
language encourages us to depict our mental states
(including perceptual contents) as perhaps more
determinate than they actually are (Dennett, 1991).
It is also illuminated by the interesting example of
“perceptual metamers” (Freeman & Simoncelli,
2011; see Figure 5), in which two images appear
subjectively indistinguishable (when viewed under
the right conditions) despite one including severe
distortions. One way to understand this
phenomenon is to suppose that visual content, at
least in the periphery, is phenomenologically
indeterminate. In line with this view, nearly 40
years ago Jerome Lettvin described peripherally
crowded letters as having “lost form without losing
crispness” and as “only seem[ing] to have a
‘statistical’ existence” (Lettvin, 1976).
Considering counterfactual HGMs in the context
of PPSMC introduces a new angle into this debate.
Madary has suggested that the “indeterminate implicit
anticipations” encoded by counterfactually-rich
generative models may plausibly be associated with
a phenomenal indeterminacy in the periphery
(Madary, 2012). This argument can be taken further
by considering that perceptual presence (subjective
veridicality) seems to be deeply associated with
subjective determinateness. A tomato perceived at
ﬁxation is experienced as perceptually real,
subjectively veridical, and also as highly determinate
—it is not partly “there” and partly “not-there.”
However, if perceptual presence depends on
counterfactually-rich HGMs, then—perhaps counter-
intuitively—subjectively determinate presence may
depend constitutively on the deployment of a suite
of indeterminate (i.e., probabilistic) counterfactual
anticipations encoding SMCs. In other words, even
(or especially) when we have an apparently
phenomenologically determinate experience of a
tomato, this determinacy may actually depend
Figure 5. Perceptual “metamers”. A. Undistorted image. B. ‘Metamerized’ image. When viewed with central ﬁxation (and at the appropriate
distance) the images are subjectively indistinguishable, despite the metamerized image incorporating large distortions. Figure provided by J.
Freeman and E. Simoncelli (see Freeman & Simoncelli, 2011).
8On this account region-speciﬁc activity is neither necessary nor
sufﬁcient for concurrent perception, since the key criterion is the
engagement of relevant top-down predictive signaling.
Accordingly, evidence for “color selective” V4 activity in
grapheme-color synesthesia—elicited by achromatic inducers—is
increasingly mixed (Hupe, Bordier, & Dojat, 2012).



























constitutively on a highly probabilistic
counterfactually-loaded HGM replete with
indeterminate implicit anticipations of the effects of
possible actions on sensory signals and their
precisions. This provides an unexpected response to
Madary’s Wittgensteinian question (and the title of his
paper): “How would the world look if it looked as if it
were encoded as an intertwined set of probability
distributions?” Surprisingly, such a world might not
“look” indeterminate at all. Rather, the implicit
operation of counterfactually-rich HGMs might
furnish exactly those properties which endow
normal perceptual phenomenology with its apparent
determinism, presence, and world-revealing nature.9
Open questions
PPSMC and its application to synesthesia exposes a
rich seam of open questions. Some of these are
identiﬁed below.
● A deﬁning but poorly understood criterion for
synesthesia is the consistency of the inducer-con-
current relationship (Baron-Cohen et al., 1987;
Eagleman et al., 2007; Rothen et al., 2013).
Consistency is difﬁcult to fake and for this rea-
son is often used as an objective test for
synesthesia (especially for grapheme-color
synesthesia). Could consistency be explained
via PPSMC by synesthetes deploying highly pre-
cise perceptual predictions?
● How can empirical tests target speciﬁcally the
putative counterfactual elements of HGMs
within PPSMC? What tests could interrogate
the differences in counterfactual richness
hypothesized to underlie the differences in per-
ceptual presence elicited by inducers and con-
currents? One possible approach may lie in
“synesthesia training” experiments where asso-
ciations are reinforced with systematic variation
of conditional sensorimotor dependencies.
● Do all instances of synesthesia involve a lack of
perceptual presence? Does the degree of percep-
tual presence associated with a concurrent
change during the development of a synesthetic
association? There is a need for increased
breadth and depth in the phenomenological
study of synesthesia to better inform and con-
strain neurocognitive models, including the pre-
sent one.
● Can PPSMC be extended to fully account for the
phenomenological differences between synesthe-
sia (in its many guises), normal perception, and
the range of other perceptual states discussed
previously (hallucinations, dreaming, imagery,
and the like)? A promising approach is to elabo-
rate in more detail roles for precision weighting
of prediction errors (Adams et al., 2013), with a
focus on the precision of counterfactual
predictions.
● Synesthesia can emerge either developmentally
or following sensory deafferentation or brain
injury (Ward, 2013). Does PPSMC—which has
dealt implicitly with developmental synesthesia
—also account for acquired cases? It could be
that, following deafferentation, the precision of
corresponding sensory prediction errors is dras-
tically reduced, leading to bottom-up signals in
this modality becoming susceptible to reshaping
via cross-modal or amodal top-down predictions
shaped during prior experience.
● Precision weighting in cortical PP is associated
with neuromodulatory molecules such as dopa-
mine and acetylcholine (and maybe oxytocin)
which affect post-synaptic gain (Friston, 2009).
What role do these molecules play in the devel-
opment of natural synesthesia and might they
also be able to induce transient synesthesia in
neurotypics (like, for example, lysergic acid
diethylamide; see Luke & Terhune, 2013)?
Others have associated synesthesia with seroto-
nin (Brang & Ramachandran, 2008) raising
related issues of how this neurotransmitter inﬂu-
ences perceptual inference.
● Can PPSMC fully account for the phenomenol-
ogy of sensory substitution (Bach-y-Rita, 1972),
for example the quasi-visual experience elicited
by tactile-visual sensory substitution? From the
perspective of cortical deference and dominance,
tactile-vision and synesthesia are opposites.
Others view sensory substitution as an acquired
form of synesthesia (Ward & Wright, 2012).
According to PPSMC, both engage predictive
models of sensory inputs with distinct combina-
tions of sensory prediction errors, top-down pre-
dictions, precision weightings, and
counterfactual richness.
● How does PPSMC relate to the “global” sense of
conscious presence that is selectively lost in con-
ditions like depersonalization and derealization
9Susanna Siegel approaches this idea via the notion of
“perspectival connectedness,” which recognizes that changes in
perspective will lead to changes in visual phenomenology.
However, she leaves open the question of whether this
conditionality is actually represented in the visual experience of




























disorders (Sierra & David, 2011)? I have pre-
viously suggested that (global) presence has to
do with the precision of interoceptive predictions
(i.e., predictions about the causes of interocep-
tive signals) within a framework of “interocep-
tive predictive coding” or “interoceptive
inference” underpinning emotion and affect
(Seth, 2013; Seth, Suzuki, & Critchley, 2011).
One approach may be to consider that, in virtue
of subjective veridicality, HGMs may recruit
interoceptive responses regarding the affective
properties of the perceived object, thereby con-
tributing to a global sense of presence.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper has outlined a predictive processing theory
of sensorimotor contingencies. PPSMC proposes that
the generative models underlying perceptual content
incorporate counterfactual probabilistic
representations of hidden causes linking ﬁctive
sensory signals (and their expected precisions) to
possible actions. This gives mechanistic focus to the
notion of mastery of sensorimotor contingencies as
described within sensorimotor theory, and explains
subjective veridicality or “perceptual presence” in
terms of the counterfactual richness of the
underlying generative models. Applied to
synesthesia, the theory accounts for the subjective
non-veridicality of concurrents by counterfactual
poverty: Concurrents are experienced as lacking in
perceptual presence because of counterfactually
impoverished generative models of how hidden
causes would modify sensory signals (and associated
precisions) in response to actions. This is because, as
compared to inducers (or the world generally), there
is no corresponding rich world-related statistical
structure for any such model to learn.
The theory is compatible with associative accounts
of developmental synesthesia (whether neonatal or
learning-based), and it accommodates the relations
between synesthesia, normal perception, and other
perceptual and quasi-perceptual states including
dreaming, imagery, hallucinations, and the like. The
theory also resolves the challenges posed by
synesthesia to enactive or sensorimotor accounts of
perception by proposing that the local substrates of
perception (which remain wholly in the brain)
implement generative models that learn both actual
and counterfactual sensorimotor contingencies.
Finally, the theory suggests a response to the
interesting question posed by predictive perception
of “what would the world look like if it looked as if
it were encoded as a set of intertwined probability
distributions” (Madary, 2012). If these distributions
are largely counterfactual, the answer may be that the
world would look as if composed of externally
existing objects with determinate features. Much as
it actually seems to.
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